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The Robert Schuman Centre was set up by the High Council of the EU1 in 
1993 to cany out disciplinary and interdisciplinary research in the areas of 
European integration and public policy in Europe. While developing its own 
research projects, the Centre works in close relation with the four departments 
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Spain has traditionally exhibited a weak, and in certain areas, non-existent 
environmental policy. This situation together with a predominance of factors 
(discussed below) has hitherto limited the introduction of new environmental 
policy instruments.
Where it existed, Spanish environmental policy was characterized by the low 
relevance of NGOs and industrial groups and by the absence of any significant 
effort at harmoniously linking economic policy and environmental protection 
(Aguilar 1993b). Despite this, four major sources of pressure can be identified, 
each of which encourages the emergence of a debate about (and the putting into 
practice of) new environmental instruments. These pressures can be broadly 
categorized as: accession to the European Union (EU), which imposed enormous 
environmental costs and prompted a search for less expensive tools; growing 
environmental awareness in Spain, which led to calls for more environmentally 
effective instruments; changes in the traditional exclusive policy style, promoting 
greater involvement of social groups in the domestic policy process; and 
administrative reforms, which encouraged greater coordination of environmental 
policy.
Before its accession to the EU, Spain had naturally had different pieces of 
environmental legislation (the first and most important one being the Law of Air 
Protection, which dates back to 1972), but their enforcement was not prioritized 
because the policy was neither socially nor politically relevant. The entry into the 
EU helped to upgrade environmental issues, not least because of the obligation to 
implement a high number of community directives. This facilitated changes in 
both the public apparatus, so that environmental policy could be better 
coordinated, and in the national policy style, so that the promotion of some 
cooperation amongst the actors involved in the policy could ease its 
implementation. All of this was accompanied by the gradual emergence of 
environmental concerns which furthered the establishment of a (still embryonic) 
debate about new instruments in the policy, be they voluntary agreements or 
economic and fiscal tools.
Spain's accession to the EU
Shortly after accession to the EU, Spain was very busy attempting to catch up 
with the bulk of environmental policy which was suddenly enforceable. Not only 
can this effort be explained by the (high) quantity and (stringent) quality of 
environmental directives and the relatively underdeveloped stage of Spanish 
legislation, but also by the fact that the government did not strike any important 



























































































membership. Since 1986, therefore, the country had to transpose into its domestic 
law (and, more importantly, to implement) a large number of stringent directives 
without any concessions concerning transitional periods or special conditions of 
application.2 Until that moment, the law had tended to ignore the harmful effects 
exerted on the environment by public or private activities and projects, while the 
authorities had rarely shown any special interest in the matter-environmental 
crimes, for instance, were not included in the Spanish Penal Code until 1993, and 
even then, these were simply limited to some punitive actions concerning 
discharges and emissions. Only at a later stage did the country begin to offer 
some resistance to certain aspects of EU environmental policy which, allegedly, 
entailed disproportionate costs or responded to the political priorities of other 
(mainly northern) member states.3
On the whole Spanish environmental regulation has mainly revolved around 
water policy, undoubtedly due to the longstanding legislative tradition in the 
management of a crucial and scarce asset. Not only has there been little 
legislation in relation to waste, coasts, and chemical products, but also the few 
existing pieces of regulation had basically followed a command and control 
approach. For this reason, the Law of Water, passed one year before Spanish EU 
membership, in 1985, represented a watershed because it introduced a tax on 
discharges called "canon". This tax was meant to help finance the costs associated 
with the cleaning-up process of rivers (or the public sewage system in the case of 
indirect discharges), or to promote the installation of purifying plants at the 
factory level (for direct discharges with no sewage system in place). Guidelines as 
to the type of plants and the specific technology needed were basically missing, 
although public financial aid (in the shape of soft credits, mainly) was offered for 
the modification of infrastructures and techniques that would lead to a reduction 
of both water consumption and water pollution.
Achieving the high standards of legal protection of the environment contained 
in the Community's regulations from such a base was therefore a very difficult 
and expensive task. In 1995, an exhaustive report made by the General Direction 
of Environmental Policy (DGPA 1995) quantified the necessary investments for 
the correction of the Spanish environmental deficit at 5.3 billion pesetas over the 
next ten years. This figure comprised the deficit accumulated due to the delays in
2 In fact, there was only a concession concerning unleaded petrol.
3 All this explains why Spain, coupled with other Southern member states, insistently demanded 
that more EU resources should be allocated for environmental protection, firstly by pressing for 
an increase of the money assigned to the LIFE programme, and secondly, and more importantly, 
by leading the campaign in favour of the creation of a new financial instrument connected with 




























































































applying EU environmental legislation as well as the costs derived from the 
application of new directives (such as 91/271 related to treatment of urban 
wastewaters). This estimation meant that the effort made hitherto should be more 
than doubled, starting from the fact that the current environmental expenditure 
comprised only 0.73% of GNP.
Growing realization of the enormous expenditures required to meet EU 
environmental standards, implementation deadlines which had long since expired, 
and continuous pressure from European Court of Justice (ECJ) rulings, led to the 
conviction that profound modifications were urgently needed. This drew attention 
to the potential advantages offered by new and less expensive (market-based) 
policy instruments. Among others, this novel focus began to be promoted by the 
former Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Environment (MOPTMA), 
whose main official, José Borrell (an engineer with a degree in economics), had 
on several occasions adhered publicly to the need to introduce more efficient 
economic instruments in environmental policy. In 1993, for instance, the official 
bulletin of the MOPTMA, called Informaciân de Medio Ambiente, included an 
editorial in which environmental economic instruments were discussed at length. 
In the same vein, the main official for the recently created Ministry of the 
Environment, Isabel Tocino, has expressed her willingness to foster those 
instruments and to allow a larger leeway for private entrepreneurs in her first 
public appearance at the Chamber of Deputies in May 1996 (JSCD 1996). More 
precisely, the minister prioritized the gradual application of the polluter-pays- 
principle,4 the analysis of ecological taxes, the passing of as many financial and 
economic incentives as necessary for a policy aiming to accomplish the principle 
of sustainable development, and the promotion of environmentally-friendly 
investments by the firms so that those who reduce pollution will be economically 
rewarded. Concerning the latter measure, the signing of agreements with financial 
institutions for the concession of credits to entrepreneurs, as well as the 
introduction of "special negative contributions" which would allow compensation 
for those expenses voluntarily incurred by individuals to protect the environment, 
was conceived (IMA 1996, No. 43). These political statements have also been 
flanked by the organization of a growing number of public debates about
4 Spain, like most countries, adheres to the polluter-pays-principle although, as a matter of fact, 
most resources assigned to environmental protection are public. Despite this, public investment 
(as a percentage of GNP) is small, above all if compared with the money spent by other OECD 
members: in the mid 80’s pollution control expenditures amounted to 0.89% in Canada, 0.60% 
in the United States, 1.17% in Japan, 0.56% in France, 0.78% in Germany, 0.95% in Holland, 
0.66% in Sweden, and 0.62% in Great Britain, whereas in Spain, in 1987, total public 
investment in the environment (not only in pollution-abatement) was only 0.60% of GNP. Yet 





























































































economic instruments. Examples of these can be found at the annually-held 
International Fair of the Environment (PROMA) in Bilbao, which brings together 
private entrepreneurs from all over the world and public authorities, and at the 
Environmental Forums promoted by the DGPA. Likewise, the Office for the 
European Communities in Spain has also organized workshops where the new 
trends in EU environmental policy have been debated, as it did in 1992 when the 
topic of financial tools for ecological improvement was chosen for discussion 
(B1MA 1992, n° 9).
To some extent, the inter-party consensus about the need to reorient 
environmental policy is implicitly recognizing the compliance problems 
associated with the command-and-control approach, and the weak influence of 
(scarce and poor) fines on environmentally-harmful practices. Besides, the 
traditional regulatory approach entails high administrative costs which are 
difficult to allocate in a federal-like state such as Spain.
Increasing environmental awareness
Since the mid 80s' opinion polls have reflected that environmental protection was 
gradually becoming a central objective at the societal level, slowly replacing what 
had previously been a weak interest in the subject. However, the alleged concern 
about the environment has not clearly translated into social willingness to act in 
favour of it, nor into greater support for green political parties. Politically, the 
new centrality of the environment could be mainly accounted for by EU 
membership and the concomitant need to transpose and implement a bulk of 
stringent legislation.
The salience of this topic was exemplified by the speech given by the Minister 
José Borrell at the Chamber of Deputies in 1993, in which he spelled out for the 
first time the priorities (soil erosion, optimization of the use of water, wastes and 
urban environment quality) and methodologies of Spanish environmental policy 
(JSCD 1993). However, in spite of this advance, Spain continued to be "different" 
for some time because of the lack of a ministry for the environment.
For years, the creation of this ministry had been demanded by various social 
sectors and political parties but the governing Socialist Party (PSOE), which was 
in power between 1982 and 1996, always opposed it on the grounds that the 1978 
Constitution had already distributed environmental powers amongst the different 
political-administrative levels, making the setting up of this specific public 
agency a second-rank issue. However valid this argument could be, the absence 




























































































ministry of this type at a time in which the European Commission was repeatedly 
blaming the environmental deficit on intergovernmental coordination problems. 
This absence was also referred to by industry, which found in it a good excuse for 
its too frequent negligent behaviour in environmental protection.
The electoral triumph of the Popular Party (PP) in March 1996 brought with it 
the setting up of the first Spanish Ministry of the Environment. While in most 
cases its political priorities do not dramatically differ from those expressed by the 
previous government, its creation has had at least two positive effects: the 
establishment of a specific parliamentary Commission for the Environment, 
which will undoubtedly facilitate the formulation and monitoring of this policy, 
and the concentration of environmental powers in the new agency. The short 
time-span elapsed since this ministry began to function does not allow as yet any 
conclusive evaluation of its performance. For this reason, it is not clear at all 
whether the new agency has simply paid lip-service to the cause of the 
environment or, quite on the contrary, is trying to modify longstanding 
institutional inertias and harmful practices. In any case, one thing which stands 
out is the more frequent references made by the responsible figures within the 
ministry to economic and voluntary instruments, so that entrepreneurs are 
provided with incentives (in terms of tax reductions, flexible deadlines, access to 
state aid etc.) to comply with environmental targets. Besides, the Minister of the 
Environment has publicly recognized that environmental law has become too 
abundant and complicated and that private actors have a terrible time when trying 
to decipher and make sense out of it. All this is naturally linked to the new 
"ideological mood" of the PP, a party which is further promoting market-based 
instruments, de regulation as well as privatization processes in different fields 
(for instance, the 1985 Law of Water is being reformed to, amongst other things, 
give ground waters back to their private owners).
Changing state-society relations
Environmental policymaking in Spain has been mainly conducted by public 
actors (government and civil servants) whereas private ones (industrial groups, 
environmentalists, citizens) have played a secondary role in the process. Not even 
independent experts, in spite of the highly technical nature of this policy, have 
been regularly called upon; this participation would have run counter the usual 
practices of an administration that rarely sets up advisory bodies or experts' 
committees, preferring, on some occasions to contract them individually or on a 
case-by-case basis (Martin Rebollo 1984). As a consequence of this, no 
institutionalized relationship or formal cooperation has been established between 




























































































the state with numerous tasks and has aggravated implementation deficits because 
the political and institutional arrangements which promote cooperation between 
public and private actors have better policy records than those of a hierarchical 
and non-inclusive nature.
In spite of the non-cooperative policy style which has traditionally prevailed 
in environmental policy-making, several projects endorsing the creation of 
organizations which would allow for social participation have been discussed 
over the last decade. In most cases, however, those projects were not approved 
whereas the rare organizations which were finally set up rendered very limited 
results. In 1984, one of the many General Law of the Environment bills under 
discussion envisaged the creation of a National Commission composed of social 
groups and public institutions, but this bill has been abandoned since then (Costa 
1985); the project on Basic Guidelines for the Protection of the Environment, 
which put forward the setting up of a High Council of the Environment in which 
administrative staff, parliament members, environmentalists, citizens, economic 
and professional associations would be brought together, was not finally taken 
into consideration either (BIMA 1980, n° 14). The only organization of this type 
which was eventually put into practice was the Committee of Public Participation 
(CPP), established in 1983 and suppressed three years later. The CPP, which 
intended to get environmental groups involved in the administration, did not 
manage to play an outstanding political role because its decisions were not 
binding on the government (IA 1986, n° 9). The latest case of institution-building 
regarding social participation in the environmental policy process is the Advisory 
Council of the Environment (ACE), set up in 1994/
The ACE, an organization upon which two basic functions have been 
conferred-to give advise on certain laws, bills and programmes, and to make 
reports and proposals at the request of the administration or on its own initiative- 
gathers 36 people who belong to a wide array of sectors (administration, 
environmentalists, farmers, businessmen, consumers, citizens). This organization 
has exhibited an ambivalent functioning to date: on the one hand, it has turned 
out to be a good forum of debate; on the other hand, and according to some of its 
participants, it has enjoyed only weak leverage on the government stance.5 6
5 The National Commission on Climate Change, set up in 1992 to comply with the compromises 
reached at the International Summit on Environment and Development organized in Rio, will 
not be included in the analysis because it is exclusively composed of scientists.
6 This fact would explain why Greenpeace and Aedenat (a national-based environmental 




























































































In lhe new regional administration the situation concerning social 
participation in environmental policy is similar to the one described for the state 
level (Aguilar 1992). Most units entrusted with environmental protection 
(irrespective of their administrative status and name, agencies, departments, 
councils) do not count on interest groups but merely on representatives of the 
administration (Suârez 1990). Those rare cases in which individuals not 
belonging to the public apparatus have been allowed to participate, have been 
recently created (making their assessment rather premature) or have had a 
disappointing functioning: the Council of the Environment in Navarre, for 
instance, was set up in February 1993 but disappeared three months later, whereas 
the Advisory Council of the Environment in Andalusia has been very rarely 
convened since its foundation. All this has ended up with the absence of an 
institutional design in which the discussion about new policy instruments in 
environmental policy, along with other topics, could take place. That is, the lack 
of appropriate forums where the main participants in this policy could gather has 
traditionally prevented the emergence of an important debate about economic 
tools in the field of environmental protection.
Yet public authorities (be they state or regional-centred) are becoming 
increasingly convinced of the need to incorporate private actors into the making 
of environmental policy. In this sense, the former State Secretary of the 
Environment, Cristina Narbona, was well rated by environmentalists because of 
her cooperation-prone attitude as well as her willingness to get conservationist 
interests involved in different forums and institutions concerned with the 
protection of the environment. As regards the new government, the Minister of 
the Environment has declared her intention to widen the social basis of the ACE 
(now renamed Advisory Forum of the Environment) so that people related to, 
among other things, land planning, hunting and fishing activities can participate 
in it. Likewise, the new ministry has proclaimed that it will promote the 
participation of social and economic actors for the improvement of the 
environment, and will foster the dialogue with social groups and NGO's from the 
perspective of "shared responsibility". Whether this new process of institution­
building will lead in the near future to a significant degree of cooperation 
between the administration and the social parties interested in environmental 
issues, gradually transforming the traditional non-cooperative policy style, or 
whether it will simply pay lip service to recommendations put forward by 
different institutions (such as the European Commission), remains to be seen. But 
one thing can be definitely established by now: the reluctance of public 
authorities towards social participation is diminishing and new policy practices 
which permit private actors to play a more important political role are being put 
into practice. One of the most outstanding examples of these new practices would 





























































































The state environmental administration has been traditionally characterized by its 
dispersion of responsibilities among different ministries and between different 
levels of political authority (Aguilar 1993b, 1997). In an attempt to solve this 
situation the Interministerial Commission for the Environment (CIMA) was set 
up in 1972. A number of reasons (overload of tasks, non-compulsory reports, lack 
of funds) impaired the functioning of this organization until its disappearance in 
1987. Alongside the languishing development of the CIMA, the Ministry of 
Public Works (MOPU, converted into the MOPT, Ministry of Public Works and 
Transport, in 1991, and, two years later, into the MOPTMA) became the main 
agency for the protection of the environment in 1977 and started, consequently, to 
concentrate an increasing number of tasks in this policy area.
The entry of Spain into the EU has fostered the putting into practice of several 
projects that aimed at overcoming both the traditional problems of dispersion of 
environmental responsibilities at the central level and the new problems of 
vertical coordination between state and regional administrations. In 1994, a new 
project which would create an interministerial commission to coordinate the 
environmental competencies among the different sections within the MOPTMA, 
and between this department and the Ministries of Agriculture, Industry,7 
Education, and Justice, was announced (IMA 1994, n° 24). A year later, the top 
state and regional officials in this policy area were convened at a Sectoral 
Conference of the Environment, and, in 1991, this forum adopted common and 
immediate goals for the protection of the environment (MI 1991 ).8
The MOPTMA period between 1993 and 1995 represents an attempt to 
configure more consolidated environmental policies. For the first time, the 
Ministry proposed the establishment of a discussion (within and outside of the 
Chamber of Deputies) about horizontal models for environmental integration, 
particularly in economic terms. The coordination between environmental policy 
and economic policy was constantly looked for throughout this period, and novel 
debates concerning the use of market mechanisms, the imposition of prices which 
would internalize the real environmental costs of products, and the possibility of
7 Likewise, an agreement between the MOPTMA and the Ministry of Industry to cooperate in 
environmental issues, and to coordinate the Spanish stance in the EU, was signed in 1994.
8 The equivalent to this conference in conservation policy would be the National Commission 
for Nature Protection (NCNP), set up in 1994. The NCNP operates at two different levels: one 
of general directors, and another of experts who gather on four different technical committees 




























































































green tax reform took place at the parliamentary level. More specifically, in 1993 
the leading official for the MOPTMA, José Borrell, presented at the Chamber of 
Deputies a policy design which would eventually lead to the elaboration of a 
National Plan of the Environment (MOPTMA 1993). Within this design, a 
heading entitled "the reorientation of market mechanisms" was included. It 
embraced, among other things, the following: the establishment of a pricing 
system to internalize recycling or waste-treatment expenses into the price of 
goods, support for agreements between the administration and entrepreneurial 
sectors to introduce environmentally-friendly technologies, the need for the 
public sector to set examples in environmental policy, the introduction of changes 
in the taxing system so that different activities would be taxed differently 
depending on their polluting effects or intensive use of non-renewable energies, 
and the promotion of eco-auditing at the firm level. The need to apply pricing 
mechanisms was exemplified by Borrell by means of a particular public good: 
water. He highlighted the fact that citizens were not paying for the total costs 
associated with the cleaning-up of water for domestic uses and that the real costs 
of the process should be somehow reflected in the bill.
In spite of the four changes discussed above, the issue of economic 
instruments in environmental policy has not yet been extensively dealt with. 
Environmentalists have been basically focused on denouncing illegal practices 
and enforcing the current legislation whereas industry, although paying lip 
service to a market-oriented strategy, has not shown a big interest in new tools 
because the traditional command-and-control approach is not rigorously applied 
anywhere, so that entrepreneurs have hitherto incurred only limited costs. 
Political parties, for their part, have not devoted much time to the discussion of 
this topic because it does not enjoy social salience. For instance, when the PP was 
still in opposition, it defended economic instruments as a sort of 
theoretical/ideological device without clearly knowing if they would be feasible 
or beneficial at all. Even now, the numerous public statements in favour of them 
have not translated into a serious discussion about their utility, nor into specific 
legislative measures or public plans.
New Policy Contents: Economic and Voluntary Instruments
Spanish environmental policy has generally had a regulative character because it 
has imposed, through legislation and regulations, limits and prohibitions on the 
productive activities of business as well as on the consumption practices of 
citizens and social groups. Increasingly however, in response to the various 
pressures discussed above, this command-and-control approach has begun to 




























































































instruments, which allow individuals and collectivities to anticipate the regulation 
and to adopt, voluntarily, certain policy objectives before the authorities approve 
and enforce them; and economic and fiscal instruments, which pursue the 
accomplishment of those objectives by means of market mechanisms and cost- 
efficiency measures. The most outstanding economic and fiscal instruments are 
discussed below.
Environmental insurance
In general terms, environmental insurance or environmental liability refers to the 
obligation placed on those responsible for certain activities with harmful effects 
on the environment to contract an insurance policy to cover potential 
environmental risks and damage. This scheme has been traditionally impaired 
because the increasing demands for insurance coverage have not been matched by 
a sufficient supply of resources from insurance companies.
In the 90s', a group of experts founded a Spanish Pool of Pollution as a type of 
environmental insurance. This pool seemed quite ambitious at first glance since it 
intended to cover the incidental and gradual effects of pollution and a wide range 
of other issues such as: environmental restoration, prevention costs, substance 
elimination costs, extraordinary emergency costs, and judicial and bail costs.
The aim of this instrument at that time was to meet the requirements of 
coverage which arose as a result of the application of the Law of Toxic and 
Hazardous Waste (Law 20/86) which embraced a highly demanding compulsory 
insurance policy. The new Ministry of the Environment announced by the end of 
1996 that an environmental liability bill was being discussed and prone to be 
shortly approved. This bill envisages, among other things, that a new insurance 
policy will be compulsory on all the activities which may harmfully impinge upon 
the environment, and not only on those related to toxic waste (as was previously 
the case), and that the signing of this insurance will have to be prior to the 
authorization of the affected firms (IMA 1997, n° 47).
Ecotaxes
On the stale level, the first experience with ecotaxes was related to water policy. 
The aim of the 1985 Water Law was to introduce fiscal measures for all water 
uses, but hitherto only domestic discharges and industrial uses under 3,500 
mVyear, and firm-based discharges have been subject to taxes. The amount of the 
tax is established on the basis of two elements, one fixed and linked to resource 
use, and another variable and linked to water consumption and the type of 




























































































clean-up measures and the improvement of the public sewage system. In this 
sense, the new instrument has basically functioned as a revenue raising tool 
which has complemented the predominant command and control approach, and it 
has not seriously promoted the reduction of pollution by means of economic 
incentives or the specification of technological requirements.
Despite the putting into practice of a water tax, a workshop about the "Global 
Management of Water" held at the Chamber of Deputies in 1990 depicted a 
worrying situation in this policy and recognized the need to promote clean-up 
programmes as well as to apply the water tax to finance them. It was estimated 
that 40% of the firms have not been charged the tax (approx. 6.5 billion pesetas), 
and 70% of the municipalities have never paid it (18.8 billion). Four years later 
the headway made in water policy was insignificant and the MOPTMA was still 
trying to implant the tax in those regions which did not have this instrument (that 
is, Andalusia, Canarias, Cantabria, Castille-La Mancha, Extremadura, Basque 
Country, Aragdn, Asturias, Castille-Le6n, and Murcia). The only region which 
has been charging this tax and increasingly receiving more money out of it is 
Catalonia: 98 billion pesetas (1983), 287 billion (1984), 663 billion (1985), 844 
billion (1986), 1 trillion (1987), and 1.2 trillion (1988) (JSC 1990). Still in 1995 
the MOPTMA estimated that just 5% of the existent 56,400 direct discharges-out 
of a total of 300,000 points of water discharges-were authorized. Besides, and to 
make things even worse, public aid to promote the introduction of the prevention 
principle in this policy has been very limited up to now.
To further water pollution control a programme called SAICA (automatic 
system for the monitoring of water quality) was approved in 1993, with an 
estimated investment of 10 billion pesetas between 1993 and 1996—85% of the 
budget coming from the EU cohesion fund. At the beginning of 1995, the 
government passed the National Plan for the Cleaning of Rivers that, containing 
1.7 billion pesetas of budget, will strive to clean up the waters of 60% of the 
population.
Likewise, the fines concerning breaches to the Water Law have been recently 
updated and now reach a maximum of 75 million pesetas. Over the last few years, 
about 12.000 notices, entailing fines which amount to 5 billion, have been levied 
on firms. The new Ministry of the Environment, for its part, has announced that it 
will emphasize the need to enforce the current water financing system, and that it 
“will dictate a decree incorporating the doctrine established by the Central 
Economic and Administrative Court [so that] those who have to pay [the water 





























































































Unlike water, the establishment of charges on waste oils represents the only 
consolidated experience of ecotaxes in Spain. The origin of this tax is found in a 
number of corresponding EC directives (e.g. 75/439 and 87/101) and the national 
regulations dealing with toxic waste of 1989 and 1990. This legal framework 
envisaged the possibility of granting indemnities to the undertakings which carry 
out the collection and/or disposal of waste oils, so as to support their correct 
management and treatment. These compensations would be financed through a 
tax applied over those products which were transformed into waste oils after their 
utilization. Although these regulations were correctly applied and abided, a bill 
was prepared in 1995 because “...the expected results in relation to the decrease in 
discharges had not taken place, perhaps due to the absence of sufficiently clear 
and stable financial mechanisms for the internalization of external economies...” 
In November of that year a Law Proposal of Waste Oil, which established a 
management scheme for this sub-product complementing that already envisaged 
by the 1986 Law of Toxic Waste, was eventually passed.
This new law embraced a tax on industrial waste oils which would permit the 
administration to dispose of the necessary funds to compensate the firms for the 
costs incurred by the fulfillment of Community requirements. This tax, which had 
an indirect character over specific consumptions, charged the manufacturing, 
acquisition and importation of oils at the rate of 6 pesetas per kg. It was estimated 
that the money raised by this levy would amount to 2.4 billion pesetas annually. 
The payment to the affected firms would be carried out by means of agreements 
with their respective regional governments. Besides, the regions would undertake 
environmental programmes in this field (compensations, aids to entrepreneurs, 
information campaigns, and investment in R&D) on the basis of those revenues 
(IMA, 1996 n°40, the implications of recycling tax revenue are discussed in chs 1 
and 11 ).
Concerning the issue of containers and packagings, the first discussions about a 
bill which contained relatively stringent objectives and innovative instruments 
produced harsh confrontation between businessmen and the government in the 
mid 90s'.9 For instance, the MOPTMA and the Spanish Confederation of 
Entrepreneurs (CEOE) entered an angry discussion at the end of 1995 about the 
utilization of PVC plastics. The Ministry announced that it was going to reduce 
their use-following the example set by other Community countries-and openly 
criticized the business resistance against this measure. In addition, the State 
Secretary of the Environment, Cristina Narbona, pointed out that “in Europe 
many firms had voluntarily done what the CEOE considered impossible” (El Pais,
9 This bill was preceded by the approval of a National Plan of Toxic Residues in 1995 which 




























































































23-11-1995). Yet the main problem arose when the industry accused the 
administration of withholding from the Parliament and the public a report, 
financed by the MOPTMA, which allegedly showed that the concentrations of 
this product in Spain were below those leading to acute alterations. Replying to 
this accusation, the Director of Environmental Policy stated that the undertaking 
of legal actions concerning the case were not ruled out “because the misuse of 
that report was very worrying” (El Pai's 23-12-1995). Disputes like this one would 
explain the following statement of the Director of the European Agency of the 
Environment, Jimenez Beltrdn, in 1996: although “coordination and
cooperation...are vital in environmental policy, in Spain the different participants 
to it do not accept each other, and there is a mutual distrust” (El Pat's 16-2-1996).
The new administration of the PP has finally approved a Law of Packaging 
Residues in 1996 which has considerably reduced previous targets and has 
consequently encountered widespread criticism from environmentalists. This law 
envisages that the different agents participating in the commercialization chain of 
a packaged product must charge their clients, up to the final consumer, a sum of 
money which will be given back to them once the package is returned. It is also 
foreseen that if the affected agents want to be exempted from this obligation, they 
should partake in an integrated management system which guarantees the regular 
collection of as well as the recycling and valorization10 targets applied to these 
subproducts. These systems will be implemented by means of voluntary 
agreements which will be supervised by the regional governments. The targets 
embraced, which will have to be fulfilled before the middle of the year 2001, are 
as follows: the valorization of 50% minimum and 65% maximum (by weight) of 
all packaging; and, within the previous objective, 25% minimum and 45% 
maximum will be subject to recycling. The law finally allows for the 
establishment by the regions of economic and fiscal measures if the minimum 
targets are not reached.
On the regional level the introduction of economic and fiscal instruments in 
environmental policies has not gone much further than on the state level. On the 
whole, only two regions have elaborated strict ecotax regulations, aimed at 
levying installations and activities with environmental harmful effects. The first 
of them is the case of the Balearic Islands where, in 1991, to raise money, a 1% 
tax was placed on firms concerned with production, storage and transformation of 
electrical energy and fuels." The other regional government which established a
10 Valorization is defined as every procedure (including incineration) which permits taking 




























































































rate for atmospheric pollution was Galicia in 1995.1 2 In this case, the act which 
envisaged a tax on S 02 emissions and oxides of nitrogen has been debated and 
agreed upon by social agents together with the authorities. The intention of this 
levy is not, unlike the first example, tax-collection but a direct reduction in 
atmospheric pollution. Although the application of this system seems to be 
satisfactory, the time elapsed since its introduction is not long enough for a 
practical evaluation of its full effects.
Ecoauditing
Environmental audits are an interesting contribution towards sound 
environmental management because they are often a prerequisite for companies 
which want to apply for public grants and subsidies. Those companies must carry 
out certain measures at plant-level if they want to benefit from those aids and to 
get an environmental certificate. In most cases, the application of audits is 
entrusted to regions although some cases fall under the responsibility of the state 
administration (IMA 1995, n° 36). Despite their importance, audits are evolving 
in a slower and less orderly manner than initially expected.
At a recent National Congress of Environmental Law, an expert on the subject 
remarked that the greatest volume of business in the Spanish auditing sector 
centred around training courses. In this sense, there are more conferences and 
congresses held on the subject than there are companies carrying them out. 
Besides, the few audits made are riddled with significant confusion: firstly, it is 
seldom remembered that audits are meant to analyze environmental quality 
systems used by companies, rather than the production processes which are at the 
heart of business activity (unfortunately, public administrations often and 
mistakenly refer to a company’s implementation of legislation affecting its 
production processes as "auditing"); secondly, certain aspects of ecoaudits impair 
them being used by entrepreneurs since they frequently unveil non-compliance 
with regulations and this results in the issuance of sanctions by the authorities and 
even in criinal proceedings (see chs 1 and 10).
11 Valuation of the various worths compounding the tax base is done by capitalising 40% of the 
average exploitation gross revenue obtained from turnover in the previous three fiscal years. 
This figure is used as the basis from which to accrue 1% which is the amount payable. See Act 
12/91 of the Autonomous Community of the Balearic Islands, relative to the creation of a tax on 
installations with effects over the environment.
12 See Act 12/95 of the Autonomous Community of Galicia, relative to the creation of a tax on 




























































































Alongside these economic instruments, voluntary measures which aim to adjust 
industrial behaviour to EU environmental obligations by means of negotiating 
agreements with different economic sectors have also been introduced. These 
compromises, which never alleviate or help circumvent requirements in force or 
to be enforced, can include objectives which go beyond EU targets. If this is the 
case, firms are given special treatment in terms of public aid, soft credits, and 
extended deadlines. However, the non-compliance of agreements by the industry 
can prompt government intervention. In this sense, the authorities, which would 
otherwise simply act as a watchdog, can resort to imposing policy objectives 
through the usual regulatory approach (enacting decrees, passing laws) (see chs 1 
and 8).
The first agreement to be signed was in 1989 and concerned the MOPU and 
the Spanish Association of Sprays with the aim to reduce the use of CFCs. 
Basically, most of the compromises of this type were signed in the mid 90s' and 
refer to the following: the agreement between the government and battery 
producers to diminish the mercury content of their products; the agreement 
whereby the State Secretary of the Environment and some manufacturers would 
foster the recycling of paper and cardboard; talks about a management 
programme for used tyres between the General Subdirection of Waste and the 
industries linked to this field; and the negotiations between the administration and 
various packaging sectors (glass, plastics, cans) to promote their recycling (IMA 
1993, n° 17; El Pais 16-12-1994). There also exist cases in which the authorities 
have supported, without directly participating, accords between private actors: for 
instance, the Stale Secretary for Environmental Policies has backed an agreement 
between the vehicle manufacturers association (ANFAC) and the firm REYFRA 
to carry out a recycling project in the car sector.
Finally, the Programme for the Creation of a Technological and 
Environmental Basis (1990-94) of the Ministry of Industry should also be 
mentioned. Although this programme cannot be defined as a new environmental 
policy instrument, it does represent the most important financial effort (38 billion 
pesetas) ever made by the administration towards helping industry to comply with 
EU requirements. The main objective of this programme was to overcome the 
environmental deficit of Spanish industry (estimated at five billion pesetas) and to 
support the (embryonic) green domestic market: 35% of the applications have 
gone to air protection, 61% to water pollution-abatement, and money has also 
been given to R&D (above all to projects which could show the utility and 
feasibility of certain techniques and programmes). One of the most remarkable 





























































































policy area where most measures have hitherto had a curatory character. Thus, 
clean technologies as well as the implementation of standards which are more 
stringent than those set up by legislation have been strongly promoted-in fact, 
50% of the firms which have received money from the programme fall within this 
category. The Program for the Creation of a Technological and Environmental 
Basis also embraces a section for the environmental adaptation of 27 large firms 
whose investment needs amount to more than 1.5 billion pesetas.
Conclusion: A Tentative Evaluation of the New Instruments in
Environmental Policy
It is still too soon to decide if the new tools discussed have been beneficial for the 
environment. On the one hand, instruments such as the Programme of the 
Ministry of Industry have seemingly had positive effects in terms of making 
industry gradually aware of the need to abide by EU legislation, without resorting 
to delaying or obstructing strategies to the same extent as before, and in terms of 
convincing some sections of the business community of the advantages 
associated with environmentally-friendly production. The results of the voluntary 
agreements have been ambivalent but they have at least helped to remove some of 
the reluctance which public authorities traditionally exhibited about social 
participation. Equally, these agreements have increased the interest of some 
private groups in being formally involved in the environmental policy process. 
On the other hand, however, there are instruments which have clearly failed to 
accomplish their objectives, as shown by the case of the water tax. Despite the 
uncertainties which surround the evaluation of new instruments in Spanish 
environmental policy, one thing can be taken for granted: the sheer fact of 
experiencing new approaches with the (explicit or implicit) aim of improving 
environmental protection is in itself positive. Yet the problem is that institutional 
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